Epstein Secrets

McKibben. Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age. Saint Martins Griffin. 2003. Met04. Thomas Nfetzinger. Being No One. Bradford, 2004. Min88. Marvin Minsky. The Society of Mind. MIT Press. 1988. Min07. Marvin Minsky. The Emotion Machine. 2007. MK07. Joseph Modayil and Benjamin Kuipers. Autonomous dev

hich data and procedure are explicitly identical, and there is just one new active data structure in place of the distinction between AtomSpace and MindAgents Where on this continuum does the "mere learning" end and the "real self-modification" start? In this chapter we consider some mechanisms for "adva

ilation 319 schema learning the learning of schemata carrying out cognitive processes in more specialized, context-dependent ways than the general MindAgents do. Eventually, once a CogPrime instance becomes sufficiently complex and advanced, these cognitive schema may replace the MindAgents altogether, l

. Bill McKibben. Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age. Saint Martins Griffin, 2003. et04. Thomas Metzinger. Being No One. Bradford, 2004. in88. Marvin Minsky. The Society of Mind. MIT Press, 1988. inO7. Marvin Minsky. The Emotion Machine. 2007. KO7. Joseph Modayil and Benjamin Kuipers. Autonomous developme

mpilation 319 schema learning the learning of schemata carrying out cognitive processes in more specialized, context-dependent ways than the general MindAgents do. Eventually, once a CogPrime instance becomes sufficiently complex and advanced, these cognitive schema may replace the MindAgents altogether, lea

which data and procedure are explicitly identical, and there is just one new active data structure in place of the distinction between AtomSpace and MindAgents Where on this continuum does the "mere learning" end and the "real self-modification" start? In this chapter we consider some mechanisms for "advan

g of how CogPrime is intended to function, and a detailed understanding of the OCF is necessary for doing concrete implementation work on CogPrime. Marvin Minsky, in a personal conversation with one of the authors (Goertzel), once expressed the opinion that a human-level general intelligence could probably be

Agent migration, and machines joining or leaving the CogPrime cluster. So, at the Unit level, attention allocation in CogPrime has two aspects: how MindAgents and Tasks receive attention from CogPrime, and how Atoms receive attention from different MindAgents and Tasks. The topic of this Section is the fo

r qualitative differences. It's true that an individual human mind may be viewed as a collective, both from a theory-of- cognition perspective (e.g. Minsky's "society of mind" theory IMM88I) and from a personality- psychology perspective (e.g. the theory of subpersonalities Illow901). And it's true that

links that could simply be found by the pattern matcher when trying to find variable assignments to satisfy (El, E2, E3, E4}. 36.4.1 Breakdown into MindAgents To make this sort of PLN dynamic work, we require a number of MindAgents to be operating "ambiently" in the background whenever inference is occurr

for Computational Linguistics. Mih07. Rada Nlihalcea. Wand sense disambiguation. Encyclopedia of Machine Learning. Springer-Verlag, 2007. Min88. Marvin Minsky. The Society of Mind. MIT Press, 1988. Mit96. Steven !Althorn The Prehistory of Mind. Thames and Hudson, 1996. MS99. Christopher Manning and Hein

d effort management frameworks attempt to enforce this, via minimizing the amount of effort spent by the system in getting to a certain conclusion. MindAgents operating primarily on one kind of knowledge (e.g. MOSES, PLN) may for a time seek to follow the shortest paths within their particular correspondin

ly specific theories of intelligence, and hence have attracted only moderate interest from researchers not adhering to these theories. An example is Minsky's work presented in The Emotion Machine IM MOM which arguably does constitute an architecture diagram for the human mind, but which is only loosely

gh STI., which rapidly decreases in meet cases local workspaces bubbles of interlinked Atoms with moderate impor- tance, focused on by a subset of MindAgents (defined in Chapter 19 of Part 2) for a period of time perceptual associative memory HebbianLinks in the AT sensory memory spaceserver/timeserve

hly specific theories of intelligence, and hence have attracted only moderate interest from researchers not adhering to those theories. An example is Minsky’s work presented in The Emotion Machine [Min07], which arguably does constitute an architecture diagram for the human mind, but which is only loosely

high STI, which rapidly decreases in most cases ocal workspaces bubbles of interlinked Atoms with moderate impor- ance, focused on by a subset of MindAgents (defined in Chapter 19 of Part 2) for a period of time perceptual associative memory |HebbianLinks in the AT sensory memory spaceserver /timeserver