Epstein Secrets

inst which he must defend." United States v. Rahimi, No. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at ■1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, "'an indictment need do little more tha

19, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Additionally, "when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in the indictment as true." Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 559. "A court should not look beyond the face 150 EFTA00077782 of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduce

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

inst which he must defend." United States v. Rahimi, No. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at ■1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, "'an indictment need do little more tha

19, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Additionally, "when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in the indictment as true." Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 559. "A court should not look beyond the face 150 EFTA00039597 of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduce

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

against which he must defend." United States v. Rahimi, 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, "an indictment need do little more than

19, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Additionally, "when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in the indictment as true." Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 559. "A court should not look beyond the face of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduced at trial, for `the

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initi

grand jury that had issued a alliena for the production of documents as parl'of an ongoing ation5). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

inst which he must defend." United States v. Rahimi, No. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, "'an indictment need do little more tha

19, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Additionally, "when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in the indictment as true." Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 559. "A court should not look beyond the face 150 EFTA00103175 of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduce

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

inst which he must defend." United States v. Rahimi, No. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, "'an indictment need do little more tha

19, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Additionally, "when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in the indictment as true." Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 559. "A court should not look beyond the face 150 EFTA00100117 of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduce

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

Parties' reliance."). 79 EFTA00100046 cau PPIal (Id. washy a granrad issulaubeaurnalMI an In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martind ell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

her the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptionalcircumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification o fprotective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc