Epstein Secrets

3 WL 322768 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) 216 United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1995 WL 10849 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1995) 77 United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397 (2d Cir. 2012) 248 United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1984) 144 United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

(citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). Whe Regardless, the subsequent invitation demonstrates that the grooming and sex acts in London were part

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

3 WL 322768 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) 216 United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1995 WL 10849 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1995) 77 United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397 (2d Cir. 2012) 248 United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1984) 144 United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

(citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). 5S Minor Victim-3 has been a she was invitedil when she was 18 years old. Regardless, the subsequent invita

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

3 WL 322768 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) 216 United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1995 WL 10849 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1995) 77 United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397 (2d Cir. 2012) 248 United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1984) 144 United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

(citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). 5S Minor Victim-3 has been a she was invitedil when she was 18 years old. Regardless, the subsequent invita

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

(citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, overt acts that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

3 WL 322768 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) 216 United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1995 WL 10849 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1995) 77 United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397 (2d Cir. 2012) 248 United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1984) 144 United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

) (citing Grunwald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). 58 egar ess, e su sequent mvitatton emonstrates t e grooming an sex acts in Lon on were part of conspiraci

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o