Epstein Secrets

nt. We have come a long way from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who said that we have nothing to fear but fear

nistration is deliberately fostering fear because it helps to keep the nation lined up behind the president. We have come a long way from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who said that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. But the war on terrorism -- which is supposed to include the war on Iraq -- cannot be acce

owell when I questioned the Powell doctrine of "we do deserts but we don't do mountains." I was very supportive of Madeleine Albright's activism on Kosovo, where I was in favor of a coalition of the willing: NATO intervention without United Nations authorization. On March 7, 2003, on the eve of war

ing it," Obama declared in his Iowa speech, echoing the advice of his pollsters and strategists. "This party—the party of Jefferson and Jackson; of Roosevelt and Kennedy—has always made the biggest difference in the lives of the American people EFTA00712759 when we led, not by polls, but by principle;

he peace accords that ended apartheid in South Africa and worked on human rights documentation and EFTA00712797 election monitoring in Bosnia and Kosovo. She then served under Richard Holbrooke at the United Nations. Nossel is credited with coining the phrase "smart power," the title of a 2004 Forei

essed American presidents to take military action, like the pugnacious little brother, egging on the more laidback big brother. Churchill did it to Roosevelt. Thatcher famously did it to a "wobbly" George H.W. Bush. His son didn't need much encouragement from Tony Blair, but he got it. Is it now David C

sad. When I ask if he thinks a "coalition of the willing" could act in Syria without a U.N. resolution, his reply is remarkably forceful. "I think Kosovo proved that there are occasions when your responsibility to protect...to save lives, to stop slaughter, to act EFTA_R1_00225772 EFTA01840716 in

erica first." In the mid-to-late 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt took a different approach, pushing back, at firs

esponse was unmistakably negative. Yet the situation in Syria was no more complex, and the efficacy of a military solution no less obvious, than in Kosovo, where President Clinton ordered U.S. participation in a NATO air campaign in 1999. The public did not support that action at first, either, but Cl

ing limited to a wall of steel that protects the oil wealth of the Kingdom and the Gulf states from Iranian aggression. In February 1945, President Roosevelt at a meeting in Egypt with Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, pledged to defend the Kingdom in exchange for a steady flow of

finally intervened. When Annan became secretary-general, the United Nations tried to bolster its peacekeeping efforts. It did better in East Timor, Kosovo and Libya in putting some teeth in the concept of a "responsibility to protect." But the abiding story has been the United Nations' limitations — i

ced at the General Disarmament Conference in Geneva that followed in 1932. When the discussions in Geneva bogged down after a year of talk, President Roosevelt insisted that “if all nations would agree to eliminate entirely from possession and use the weapons which make possible a successful attack, defenses

, Tehran will have an extra element of coercive leverage. Under these circumstances, leaving Iraq entirely would be an act of folly. We are still in Kosovo, South Korea and other post-conflict zones that are far more stable. We need to be in Iraq too. We don't need to keep 50,000 troops there, but a con