Epstein Secrets

w to represent, organize, and use much of commonsense knowledge, let alone build a machine that could learn all of that automatically on its own. As John McCarthy noted long ago: "in order for a program to be capable of learning something, it must first be able to represent that knowledge." There arc very few

March 2002, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (2002). (24.) M. Minsky, The Society of Mind, Simon & Schuster, New York (1985). (25.) A. Sloman, "Beyond Shallow Models of Emotion," Cognitive Processing I, No. 1 (2001). EFTA00176586 The reactive and deliberative layers differ in that the de

w to represent, organize, and use much of commonsense knowledge, let alone build a machine that could learn all of that automatically on its own. As John McCarthy noted long ago: "in order for a program to be capable of learning something, it must first be able to represent that knowledge? There are very few

, Simon & Schuster, New York (1985). (25.) A. Sloan, "Beyond Shallow Models of Emotion," Cognitive Processing I, No. 1 (2001). EFTA00284258 (26.) A. Sloman, "Architectural Requirements for Human-Like Agents both Natural and Artificial," K. Dautenhahn, Editor, Human Cognition and Social Agent Technology,

w to represent, organize, and use much of commonsense knowledge, let alone build a machine that could learn all of that automatically on its own. As John McCarthy noted long ago: "in order for a program to be capable of learning something, it must first be able to represent that knowledge." There are very few

March 2002, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (2002). (24.) M. Minsky, The Society of Mind, Simon & Schuster, New York (1985). (25.) A. Sloman, "Beyond Shallow Models of Emotion," Cognitive Processing I, No. 1 (2001). EFTA00226828 •I • The reactive and deliberative layers differ in that