Epstein Secrets

reciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotingHerring v. Un ited States,555 U.S. 135, 141(2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

a witness against himself, within the meaning of the fifth amendment." (Det. Mot. 11 at 15) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, the Second Circuit ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of private papers that are not business d

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

s the proper remedy.39 Indeed, none of the Second Circuit cases applying Martindell contemplate suppression as a remedy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d at 1224 (remanding for findings "on whether the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the gover

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of imm