Epstein Secrets

ure had the desired effect, as analysts covering the Company took note of its remarkably low VaR numbers. In a February 9, 2007 pre- filing comment, Credit Suisse analysts Susan Roth Katzke and Ross Seiden stated that Bear Steams' "[m]anagement will continue to invest to grow revenues via new products and new

s; it claims to be an agency-only company. (So much for that concept.) 260. Bove's chagrin was shared by the Company's lenders. On March 6, 2008, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it wouldn't renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. That meant Raboban

ccordance with generally accepted accounting principles[.] 474. Moreover, according to a February, 2008 presentation given by Molinaro himself to Credit Suisse analysts, the Company's risk management structure reported directly to him. 475. As alleged above in paragraphs 106,167 and 175, Molinaro knew, or

arties to refuse to lend to the Company. 470. Moreover, as the Company's CEO, Schwartz knew or was reckless in not knowing that on March 6, 2008, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it wouldn't renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. C. Samuel L. Mol

mpany's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $24.41 billion. Moreover, according to the Company's February 8, 2008 presentation to Credit Suisse analysts, $7.5 billion of this amount represented residential mortgages. Because these assets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value

een a problem. 792. At the time he made this statement, Schwartz, as the Company's CEO, was aware that on March 6, 2008, more than a week earlier, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it would not renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. He also knew tha