Epstein Secrets

upport her argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment where the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different 53 Whi

a witness against himself, within the meaning of the fifth amendment." (Det. Mot. 11 at 15) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, the Second Circuit ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of private papers that are not business d

upport her argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment where the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different 53 Whi

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

upport her argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment where the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different 53 Whi

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

upport her argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment where the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different in eac

s the proper remedy.39 Indeed, none of the Second Circuit cases applying Martindell contemplate suppression as a remedy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d at 1224 (remanding for findings "on whether the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the gover

upport her argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment where the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different While

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of imm