Epstein Secrets

686 , To Be Filed Under Seal statutory and common law privacy concerns. (Dkt. No. 38 at 1.) Maxwell submitted a proposed form of order for Judge Sweet's consideration. (Dkt. No. 39-1.) Giuffre represented that she "[did] not oppose the entrance [sic] of a Protective Order in this case, but [did] o

r, the judge would have granted its request. Id. at 93-94. While the Martindell factors were never mentioned expressly by the district court, Judge Broderick observed that the confidentiality order did not implicate "technological trade secrets, currently sensitive customer lists, or contemporarily sensit

nder U.S. Attorney numbers. This should have been brought as a miscellaneous matter. MR. : So, your Honor, it was originally submitted with Judge Sweet -- THE COURT: I understand what he did, but I will tell you that in the opinion that will never issue, because Judge Sweet died, but he had written

8 4 Xj3q1gra SEALED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 very clearly said that, and Judge Broderick said in Chemical Bank the proper procedure is for somebody to make a motion to be relieved from the terms of the protective order. And it ain't yo

States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) 3, 5, 6, 9 Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) 3 DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir. 1985) 10 Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2000) 10, 13 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 3, 15 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) 2, 4 In re Grand Ju

idential information at the conclusion of the case, including Maxwell's deposition transcripts refused to do so although ordered to do so by Judge Sweet.' In its application to the governmen Not only did the government misunderstand how the Protective Order worked, but its argument also supports r