Epstein Secrets

ome provisions and adding language that confidential material could be disclosed to law enforcement. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. B). On March 18, 2016, Judge Sweet entered a protective order governing the discovery and dissemination of confidential information after the parties agreed to the form of the order o

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Saftar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

y 29, 2016 Meeting Exhibit 6: November 30, 2018 Email Exhibit 7: December 6, 2018 Email Exhibit 8: February 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Sweet Exhibit 9: February 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Netburn Exhibit 10: Transcript of April 22, 2016 Deposition Exhibit 11: Transcript of Jul

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

y 29, 2016 Meeting Exhibit 6: November 30, 2018 Email Exhibit 7: December 6, 2018 Email Exhibit 8: February 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Sweet Exhibit 9: February 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Netburn Exhibit 10: Transcript of April 22, 2016 Deposition Exhibit 11: Transcript of Jul

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

me provisions and adding language that confidential material could be disclosed to law enforcement. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. B).31 On March 18, 2016, Judge Sweet entered a protective order governing the discovery and dissemination of confidential information after the parties agreed to the form of the order o

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 177 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 52 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 120, 121 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 22 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

ow being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamen

y 29, 2016 Meeting Exhibit 6: November 30, 2018 Email Exhibit 7: December 6, 2018 Email Exhibit 8: February 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Sweet Exhibit 9: February 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Netbum Exhibit 10: Transcript of April 22, 2016 Deposition Exhibit 11: Transcript of July

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217