Epstein Secrets

be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon, 2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the Giuffre action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know th

material is in the possession of a third- party, a defendant has standing to challenge a grand jury subpoena of that material. Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Feb. 18, 1988, 685 F. Supp. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (law firm could intervene and join motion to quash grand jury subpoena issued to private 1

ity to be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon, 2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know th

material is in the possession of a third- party, a defendant has standing to challenge a grand jury subpoena of that material. Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Feb. 18, 1988, 685 F. Supp. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (law firm could intervene and join motion to quash grand jury subpoena issued to private 1

ity to be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon, 2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know th

material is in the possession of a third- party, a defendant has standing to challenge a grand jury subpoena of that material. Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Feb. 18, 1988, 685 F. Supp. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (law firm could intervene and join motion to quash grand jury subpoena issued to private 1

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

the proper remedy.38 Indeed, none of the Second Circuit cases applying Martindell contemplate suppression as a remedy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jut), Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d at 1224 (remanding for findings "on whether the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government