Epstein Secrets

No. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2222145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) 83 United States v. Carpenter, 680 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) 50 United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972) 217, 219 United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197 (D. S.C. 1984) 23 United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 14

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ing evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements "concern the subst

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

No. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2222145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) 83 United States v. Carpenter, 680 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) 50 United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972) 217, 219 United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197 (D. S.C. 1984) 23 United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 14

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ing evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements "concern the subst

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

No. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2222145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) 83 United States v. Carpenter, 680 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) 50 United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972) 217, 219 United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197 (D. S.C. 1984) 23 United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 14

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ing evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements "concern the subst

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

ing evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements "concern the subst

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

No. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2222145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) 83 United States v. Carpenter, 680 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) 50 United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972) 217, 219 United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197 (D. S.C. 1984) 23 United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 14

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ing evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements "concern the subst

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o