Epstein Secrets

, the court's task is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate if, resolving all ambiguities a

d OFM by letter that he intended to exercise his right of first refusal and renew the lease. Epstein contends that in a telephone conference between Richard Massey of OFM and Jeffrey Schantz, Epstein's transaction counsel, on April 19, 1996, OFM orally consented to Epstein's request to sublet the Premises to F

26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)), there exists a dispute about a material fact "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once the moving party meets its initial burden of production, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there

d OFM by letter that he intended to exercise his right of first refusal and renew the lease. Epstein contends that in a telephone conference between Richard Massey of OFM and Jeffrey Schantz, Epstein's transaction counsel, on April 19, 1996, OFM orally consented to Epstein's request to sublet the Premises to F

court's task is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether thre is a genuine issue for trial." I Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2605, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate if, resolving all ambiguities and

M by letter that he intended to exercise his right of first refusal and renew the lease. Epstein contends that in a telephone confer- ence between Richard Massey of OFM and EFTA00187393 Jeffrey Schantz, Epstein's transaction coun- sel, on April 19, 1996, OFM orally consented to Epstein's request to sublet