Epstein Secrets

2002) 115 United States v. Harrison, 764 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 72 United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) 160 United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006) 132, 133 United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003) 61, 62 United States v. Henry, 861 F. Supp. 119

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

hat each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would be resolved in the government's favor."' Id. (quoting Heath, 455 F.3d at 60). As the Supreme Court has explained, if the Government can establish that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by la

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

. 2002) 115 United States v. Harrison, 764 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 72 United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) 160 United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006) 132, 133 United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003) 61, 62 United States v. Henry, 861 F. Supp. 1190

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

that each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would be resolved in the government's favor." Id. (quoting Heath, 455 F.3d at 60). As the Supreme Court has explained, if the Government can establish that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by la

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

. 2002) 115 United States v. Harrison, 764 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 72 United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) 160 United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006) 132, 133 United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003) 61, 62 United States v. Henry, 861 F. Supp. 1190

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

that each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would be resolved in the government's favor." Id. (quoting Heath, 455 F.3d at 60). As the Supreme Court has explained, if the Government can establish that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by la

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

that each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would be resolved in the government's favor." Id. (quoting Heath, 455 F.3d at 60). As the Supreme Court has explained, if the Government can establish that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by la

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

2002) 115 United States v. Harrison, 764 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 72 United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) 160 United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006) 132, 133 United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003) 61, 62 United States v. Henry, 861 F. Supp. 119

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

that each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would be resolved in the government's favor." Id. (quoting Heath, 455 F.3d at 60). As the Supreme Court has explained, if the Government can establish that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by la

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o