Epstein Secrets

someone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts." United States v. Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ahmad, 992 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("ordinarily [a factual issue must be] raised by a

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

someone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts." United States v. Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ahmad, 992 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("ordinarily [a factual issue must be] raised by a

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

omeone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts." United States v. Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ahmad, 992 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("ordinarily [a factual issue must be] 112 EFTA00

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

EFTA00095174 to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

someone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts." United States v. Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ahmad, 992 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("ordinarily [a factual issue must be] raised by a

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

someone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts?' United States v. Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d 567,570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ahmad, 992 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("ordinarily [a factual issue must be] raised by a

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi