Epstein Secrets

guage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Mingio,209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00100120 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00077785 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00039600 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

guage of the statute charged,' her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). 152 EFTA00095244 First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of

dictment referred to victims by pseudonyms, is particularly instructive here. See id. at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00103178 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure