Epstein Secrets

guage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Mingio,209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00100120 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

ears found grooming behavior to be a means to "persuade, induce, or entice" minorsto engage in illegal sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition wou

d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition would reasonably include Thompson's grooming of the minor victims to act as he desired with regard to many matters over the months before he made the video."); United States v. Dorv

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00077785 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

ars found grooming behavior to be a means to "persuade, induce, or entice" minors to engage in illegal sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition wou

d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition would reasonably include Thompson's grooming of the minor victims to act as he desired with regard to many matters over the months before he made the video."); United States v. Dorv

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00039600 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

ars found grooming behavior to be a means to "persuade, induce, or entice" minors to engage in illegal sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition wou

d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition would reasonably include Thompson's grooming of the minor victims to act as he desired with regard to many matters over the months before he made the video."); United States v. Dorv

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00103178 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

ars found grooming behavior to be a means to "persuade, induce, or entice" minors to engage in illegal sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition wou

d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition would reasonably include Thompson's grooming of the minor victims to act as he desired with regard to many matters over the months before he made the video."); United States v. Dorv

guage of the statute charged,' her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). 152 EFTA00095244 First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of

dictment referred to victims by pseudonyms, is particularly instructive here. See id. at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition would reasonably include Thompson's grooming of the minor victims to act as he desired with regard to many matters over the months before he made the video."); United States v. Dorve

of victims, even if important, generally need not appear there unless their omission would seriously prejudice the defendant. See United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Maxwell likely knows the identity of the alleged

nce and to bring to the Court's attention any issues that require resolution before trial. "This is all that Rule 404(b) requires." United States v. Thompson, No. 13-cr-378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013). The Court concludes this schedule is generally reasonable, although additiona

of victims, even if important, generally need not appear there unless their omission would seriously prejudice the defendant. See United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Maxwell likely knows the identity of the alleged

nce and to bring to the Court's attention any issues that require resolution before trial. "This is all that Rule 404(b) requires." United States v. Thompson, No. 13-cr-378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013). The Court concludes this schedule is generally reasonable, although additiona

Filed 04/16/21 Page 21 of 34 Moreover, the Government has agreed to disclose their names in advance of trial. There is thus no unfairness here. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 126. As discussed below, the Court will require the parties to negotiate and propose a full schedule for all remaining pretrial disclos

nce and to bring to the Court's attention any issues that require resolution before trial. "This is all that Rule 404(b) requires." United States v. Thompson, No. 13-cr-378 (MN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013). The Court concludes this schedule is generally reasonable, although additional