Epstein Secrets

L. Weekly D1540 and the like committed during judicial proceedings are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state," Wright, 446 So.2d at 1164, other tortious conduct occurring during litigation is equally susceptible to that same discipline. Levitt, 639 So.2d at 608

Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907). In Levitt, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.I994), the Florida Supreme Court extended the litigation privilege, already applicable to defamatory statements (slander and libel) and perjury, to all other torts so long as the

pre-date Wolfe (2013), Echevarria (2007), and Levin (1994), or decisions from other States. See Edwards's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9, citing Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (5th DCA 1984); Kalt v. Dollar Rent-A-Car,422 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Graham-Eckes Pahn Beach Academy, Inc.

ing and a lengthy hearing, this Court ruled that the litigation privilege barred Edwards's causes of action against Epstein. The Court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa

he Court can determine whether Plaintiff "had a reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances known to him, in the validity of his claim." See Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (defining probable cause) (citing Goldstein v. Sabella, 88 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1956)). Bifurcatin

tion. A21 EFTA00798187 Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in November 2015, with the Mandate issuing in December 2015. The matter was sent to the Florida Supreme Court and, in large part, there were no substantive filings in this case until June 2017, after the Supreme Court declined jurisdiction. Defendant notice

ite to the instant case, and as such its narrow holding has no bearing on, and should not be considered by, this Court. Similarly, Appellant cites Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) in support of his assertion that the litigation privilege is inapplicable to a malicious prosecution

ving the litigation privilege. In the instant case, the trial court was legally bound by the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Wolfe, as the Florida Supreme Court stated unequivocally that a "trial court may not overrule or recede from the controlling decision of" an appellate court. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2

pre-date Wolfe (2013), Echevarria (2007), and Levin (1994), or decisions from other States. See Edwards's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9, citing Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (5th DCA 1984); Kalt v. Dollar Rent-A-Car,422 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Graham-Eckes Palm Beach Academy, Inc.

ing and a lengthy hearing, this Court ruled that the litigation privilege barred Edwards's causes of action against Epstein. The Court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa