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1/N, where PA is the fixation probability of an A mutant in a population of B individuals (Nowak et al 2004a, Ohtsuki et al 2007, Imhof et al 2006, Lessard and Ladret 2007). The above condition can thus be interpreted as follows: in a 2 x 2 game with mixed strategies, pure strategy B is favored if pure