Epstein Secrets

uffice to drive some kind of non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless interested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case that emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point here, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think that emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with respect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is fun) to equip AIs with emotion, mood, affect and emoti

OS that coordinates the swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an artificial mind. L

al, inference, analogy building etc. to work. And some have to do with the requirements of translating between Mentalese (in Pinker's sense, not in Fodor's) and natural language. I may delude myself in thinking that I know what the basics are. In fact, it is extremely likely that I do (every computer

uffice to drive some kind of non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless interested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case that emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point here, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think that emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with respect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is fun) to equip AIs with emotion, mood, affect and emoti

OS that coordinates the swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an artificial mind. L

al, inference, analogy building etc. to work. And some have to do with the requirements of translating between Mentalese (in Pinker's sense, not in Fodor's) and natural language. I may delude myself in thinking that I know what the basics are. In fact, it is extremely likely that I do (every computer

uffice to drive some kind =f non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless =nterested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case =hat emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual =motion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point =ere, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think =hat emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with =espect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is =un) to equip Ms with emotion, mood, affect and emotion

val, inference, =nalogy building etc. to work. And some have to do with the requirements =f translating between Mentalese (in Pinker's sense, not in Fodor's) and =atural language. I may delude myself in thinking that I know what the basics are. In =act, it is extremely likely that I do (every computer

uffice to drive some kind =f non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless =nterested in understanding and modeling them. » I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case » =hat emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, » actual =motion.) > Most of wha

=his I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. I believe that Richard Gregory had a version of that argument well =efore Sloman > Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate = functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an =rtificial mind.

val, inference, =nalogy building etc. to work. And some have to do with the requirements =f translating between Mentalese (in Pinker's sense, not in Fodor's) and =atural language. I don't disagree with any of the above > I may delude myself in thinking that I know what the basics are. In =act, it is e