Epstein Secrets

at emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I would say against that has been better expressed by Aaron Sloman. For instance, if my computer is prone to swapping memory content to hard drive and back, and I kill the part of the OS that coordinates the swappi

uffice to drive some kind of non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless interested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case that emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point here, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think that emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with respect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is fun) to equip AIs with emotion, mood, affect and emoti

OS that coordinates the swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an artificial mind. L

at emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I would say against that has been better expressed by Aaron Sloman. For instance, if my computer is prone to swapping memory content to hard drive and back, and I kill the part of the OS that coordinates the swappi

uffice to drive some kind of non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless interested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case that emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point here, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think that emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with respect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is fun) to equip AIs with emotion, mood, affect and emoti

OS that coordinates the swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an artificial mind. L

SKBB91. D Shannahoff-Khalsa, M Boyle, and M Buebel. The effects of lateral forced nostril breathing on cognition. Ind J Neurosci., 1991. SloOl. Aaron Sloman. Varieties of affect and the cogaff architecture schema. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Emotion, Cognition, and Affective Computing, AISB-01, 20

nd S. R. Krause. Hierarchical complexity of tasks shows the existence of developmental stages. Developmental Review. 18, 18.:237-278, 1998. Dam00. Antonio Damasio. The Feeling of What Happens. Harvest Books, 2000. Dav84. D. Davidson. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19

SKBB91. D Shannahoff-Khalsa, M Boyle, and M Buebel. The effects of unilateral forced nostril breathing on cognition. Int J Neurosct., 1991. Slo01. Aaron Sloman. Varieties of affect and the cogaff architecture schema. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Emotion, Cognition, and Affective Computing, AISB-01, 200

ichards, and S. R. Krause. Hierarchical complexity of tasks shows the existence of developmental stages. Developmental Review. 18, 18.:237-278, 1998. Antonio Damasio. The Feeling of What Happens. Harvest Books, 2000. D. Davidson. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Rob