Epstein Secrets

294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Joseph berg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Saftar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217

is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally true

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S.

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally true

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S.

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally true

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

ed States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 169 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) 169, 170, 172, 173 United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 121 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 202 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S.

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 177 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 52 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 120, 121 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 22 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally true

ow being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamen

) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217