Epstein Secrets

294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Joseph berg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S

United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 159 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 passim Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) 159 Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) passim EFTA00099946 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) Colo

is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally true

poena on (Def. ef. Mot. 3 Chief Judge McMahon ss the misconduct at issugare: modification (Def. M 4" See, e.g., Exs. 8 & 9 at 2-3 (discussing Chemical Bank as rejecting a contempt request where a party "compl[ied] with a grand jury subpoena despite the existence of a protective order" and focusing argu

) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S.

. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 159 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 passim Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) 159 Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) passim EFTA00077611 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) Colo

) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S.

. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 159 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 passim Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) 159 Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) passim EFTA00039426 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) Colo

) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 259 United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) passim United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) 182 United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 294 United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S

United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 159 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 passim Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) 159 Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) passim EFTA00103004 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) Colo

is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally true

y time prior to the Government opening its investigation. (Def. Mot. 3 at 1). Instead, Chief Judge McMahon's question was more specific: referencing Chemical Bank and the desire to avoid "a Chemical Bank kind of situation," Chief Judge McMahon asked about contacts between the two parties "prior to the issuanc