Epstein Secrets

ed by Ben Goertzel as an attempt to revive the original AI), BICA (a remnant from the failed DARPA proposal of the same name, and later picked up by Alexei Samsonovich as an alternative to AGI, I suspect because he does not get along with Ben), and Cognitive Systems (Pat Langley et al.). I basically like them all,

uffice to drive some kind of non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless interested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case that emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point here, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think that emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with respect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is fun) to equip AIs with emotion, mood, affect and emoti

OS that coordinates the swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an artificial mind. L

ed by Ben Goertzel as an attempt to revive the original Al), BICA (a remnant from the failed DARPA proposal of the same name, and later picked up by Alexei Samsonovich as an alternative to AGI, I suspect because he does not get along with Ben), and Cognitive Systems (Pat Langley et al.). I basically like them all,

uffice to drive some kind of non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless interested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case that emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual emotion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point here, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think that emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with respect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is fun) to equip AIs with emotion, mood, affect and emoti

OS that coordinates the swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an artificial mind. L

ed =y Ben Goertzel as an attempt to revive the original Al), BICA (a =emnant from the failed DARPA proposal of the same name, and later sicked up by Alexei Samsonovich as an alternative to AGI, I suspect =ecause he does not get along with Ben), and Cognitive Systems (Pat =angley et al.). I basically like them all,

uffice to drive some kind =f non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless =nterested in understanding and modeling them. > I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case =hat emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual =motion.) Most of what I wou

making a merely philosophical point =ere, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think =hat emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with =espect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is =un) to equip Ms with emotion, mood, affect and emotion

t to revive the original AI) I don't know about this > , BICA (a remnant from the failed DARPA proposal of the same name, and > =ater picked up by Alexei Samsonovich as an alternative to AGI, I > =uspect because he does not get along with Ben) Yes, the history is correct -- I was part of one of the original team

uffice to drive some kind =f non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless =nterested in understanding and modeling them. » I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case » =hat emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, » actual =motion.) > Most of wha

=his I cannot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. I believe that Richard Gregory had a version of that argument well =efore Sloman > Damasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate = functional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an =rtificial mind.