Epstein Secrets

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the limit of incremental mutation (small mutational effect size). Our calculations in this section are remi- niscent of adaptive dynamics (Nowak and Sigmund, 1990; Hof- bauer and Sigmund. 1990; 0ieckmann and Law. 1996; Metz et al.. 1996; Geritz et al., 1998). which is usually formulated for asexual and

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