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aise for The Evolution of Cooperation "I never expected to find wisdom or hope for the future of our species in a computer game, but here it is, in Axelrod's book. Read it." —LEWIS THOMAS, State University of New York, Stony Brook "Our ideas of cooperation will never be the same again.... This book, if

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antages to mutual cooperation. For example, in the classic two-player game called the Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod. 1984). cooperation results in a "reward payoff' if one's partner also cooperates but a "suckers payoff' if one's partner defects. Defection yield

with Incomplete Information The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma has famously been used as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation among non-kin (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Dawkins, 2006; Pinker, 2003; Trivers, 1971). In this section, we show how the same basic model can be used to explain many of the q

iving vs. giving in. Yale University Working Paper. Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chammah, A. M., & Rapoport, A. (1965). Prisoner’s dilemma; a study in conflict and coopera- tion. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Chwe, M.