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in which having a different behavior than one's partner produces a higher payoff. Doves cooperate by sharing resources but retreat when challenged. Hawks do not cooperate. They are ready to fight to avoid leaving an interaction empty-handed. A Hawk gets the entire resource when facing a Dove but suff

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. 0, the mixed phase extends to the quarter-plane a > 0, > 0. For large mutation ratesµ —• co, however, the mixed phase disappears. 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves As an example, we consider the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith 1982, Houston Mcishunara 1988, Houston Sc McNamara 1991, IvIesterton-Gibbons