Epstein Secrets

1974) 137 vii EFTA00099948 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 157, 174, 175 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 158 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 144 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 223 Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) 56 Mr v. Willi

.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 137 vii EFTA00099948 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 157, 174, 175 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 158 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 144 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 223

does not apply. The defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a "failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

does not apply. The defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a "failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

does not apply. The defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a "failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

ucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 96 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 108, 117, 118 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 108 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 100 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 149 Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) 40 Nix v. Will

385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 104 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 96 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 108, 117, 118 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 108 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 100 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 149

does not apply. The defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a "failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

does not apply. The defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a "failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be