Epstein Secrets

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in context to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore should deny the motion. In any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, the questions wer

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in context to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore should deny the motion. In any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, the questions wer

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in context to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore should deny the motion. In any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, the questions wer