Epstein Secrets

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

e whether the defendant's statements would have tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) ("It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely t

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

e whether the defendant's statements would have tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) ("It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely t

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

e whether the defendant's statements would have tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) ("It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely t

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary 130 EFTA00095222 intelligence would not think that a question asking for inform

e whether the defendant's statements would have tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) ("It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely t

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding 'rea

e whether the defendant's statements would have tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) ("It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely t