Epstein Secrets

ed States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) 300, 301 United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005) 33,37,38,46 United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 194 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) 300, 301 United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005) 33, 37, 38, 46 United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 194 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) 300, 301 United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005) 33, 37, 38, 46 United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 194 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `rea

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary 130 EFTA00095222 intelligence would not think that a question asking for inform

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) 300, 301 United States v. Jqffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005) 33, 37, 38, 46 United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 194 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

understanding by a questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding 'rea

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o