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Cooperating Without Looking Moshe Hoffman,!?*? Erez Yoeli,2°* Martin Nowak? ‘Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 ?Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Har

Looking Moshe Hoffman,!?*? Erez Yoeli,2°* Martin Nowak? ‘Department of Computer Science and Engineering

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e or her behavior imitated or reinforced, causing the behavior to spread. This intuition is formalized using mod- els of evolutionary dynamics (e.g., Nowak, 2006). The key result for evolutionary dynamic models is that, except under extreme conditions, behavior converges to Nash equilibria. This result

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