Epstein Secrets

ic selfish genes as tools for the control and genetic engineering of 193 natural populations. Proc. BioL Sci. 270,921-928 (2003). 194 2. Esvelt, K. M., Smidler, a. L., Catteruccia, F. & Church, G. M. Concerning RNA-guided 195 gene drives for the alteration of wild populations. Elife 3, e03401 (201

1 The evolutionary dynamics of RNA-guided gene drives 2 Charleston Noble., Jason Olejarz., ..., George M. Church & Martin A. Nowak 3 The genetic manipulation of wild populations has been discussed as a solution to a number 4 of humanity's most pressing ecological and public h

Jason Olejarz., ..., George M. Church & Martin A. Nowak 3 The genetic manipulation of wild populations

.J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizeable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 113, 171-195; Carlsmith, K. M., Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2008). The paradoxical consequences of revenge. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95 (6), 1316-1324; de

e, 444(7120), 718-723; Sigmund, K., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. (2001). Reward and punishment. Proceedings of

onomic Journal, 100, 464-477. Andreoni, J., Rao, J. M., & Trachtman, H. (2011). Avoiding the ask: A fiel

e or her behavior imitated or reinforced, causing the behavior to spread. This intuition is formalized using mod- els of evolutionary dynamics (e.g., Nowak, 2006). The key result for evolutionary dynamic models is that, except under extreme conditions, behavior converges to Nash equilibria. This result