Epstein Secrets

ivileges and from the policy of construing privileges narrowly, so as to protect the "search for truth." 689 F.2d at 1003 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). Here the Court has strong reason to be skeptical of a new plea bargaining privilege. The transparent purpose behind Epstein'

f 27 claiming the protection has voluntarily disclosed work product to a party not covered by the work-product doctrine." United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 783 (10th Cir. 2008). Perhaps recognizing the difficulty inherent in its position under these well-recognized general principles, the Governme

t to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Nixon v. Warner Commtans, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,599 (1978). The panel lacks the context and familiarity with the facts, the parties and the non-parties to a

able one. As Lugosch holds, it can be overcome by "specific, on-the- record findings that higher values necessitate a narrowly tailored sealing." 435 F.3d at 126. The Order to Show Cause is improperly dismissive both of the rebuttal of the presumption Ms. Maxwell is entitled to make and the procedure

ian, 824 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1987) 233 xviii EFTA00103017 United States v. Nitsche, 843 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2011) 201, 202 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 282 United States v. Noble, No. 07 Cr. 284 (RJS), 2008 WL 140966 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2008) 164 United States v. Okwumabua,

run.") (citing Falter, 23 F.3d at 425-26). And other circuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Cong