Epstein Secrets

w enforcement authorities every 90 clays. As discussed at the July 15, 2019 bail hearing, counsel for Mr. Epstein made an application in New York State Supreme Court in 2011 to re- duce Epstein's sex offender registration status from Level III to Level I. If grant- ed, this reduction would have allowed Mr. Epste

release." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). "The weight afforded to each factor under section 3142(g) is within the `special prov- ince' of the district court." Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 610. At the outset, it should be noted that the Pretrial Services Report, dated July 12, 2019, concludes that: "The defendant

C. § 3142(g). "The weight afforded to each factor under section 3142(g) is within the 'special prov- ince of the district court." United States v. Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting United States v. Shaker, 817 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)). 313 [9] "The rules concerning admi

w enforcement authorities every 90 clays. As discussed at the July 15, 2019 bail hearing, counsel for Mr. Epstein made an application in New York State Supreme Court in 2011 to re- duce Epstein's sex offender registration status from Level III to Level I. If grant- ed, this reduction would have allowed Mr. Epste

release." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). "The weight afforded to each factor under section 3142(g) is within the `special prov- ince' of the district court." Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 610. At the outset, it should be noted that the Pretrial Services Report, dated July 12, 2019, concludes that: "The defendant

C. § 3142(g). "The weight afforded to each factor under section 3142(g) is within the 'special prov- ince of the district court." United States v. Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting United States v. Shaker, 817 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)). 313 [9] "The rules concerning admi

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

ited States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 205, 209, 210, 220 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 252 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 253 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 115, 161, 162 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

ited States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 205, 209, 210, 220 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 252 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 253 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 115, 161, 162 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

United States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 138, 140, 147 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 165 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 165 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 82, 110 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 201

the counts would waste judicial resources by requiring a second trial at 53 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, 165 EFTA00095257 uncharged

d. at 538-39. "[L]ess drastic measures ... such as limiting instructions, 52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, uncharged acts are admissible