Epstein Secrets

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00040678 deliberatel

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00106053 Case 1:20-c

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00066524 deliberatel

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00087265 deliberatel

omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional misstatements—necessarily require suppression. A

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00087244 deliberatel

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

e district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.")); United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). This Circuit "presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

e district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.")); United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). This Circuit "presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

e district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.")); United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). This Circuit "presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

e district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.")); United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). This Circuit "presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively