Epstein Secrets

tain any of the moneys . . . or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution.")). Weigand's suggestion that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelly v. United States, _S. Ct._, No. 18- 1059, 2020 WL 2200833 (May 7, 2020) would in any way affect the outcome of this case is

10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) 6, 19 United States v. Morales, 280 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 6 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 10 United States v. Muyet, 945 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 8 United States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565

. That is particularly true where, as here, "the Government has provided discovery that will enable a defendant to adequately prepare his defense." Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 721-22; see also Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 574 ("Generally, if the information sought by defendant is provided in the indictment o

d. at 538-39. "[L]ess drastic measures ... such as limiting instructions, 52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

the relevance of these allegations, the defendant has not satisfied the "exacting" standard required to justify striking portions of an Indictment. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (quoting Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 610). Accordingly, the motion should be denied, or, at the very least, deferred until "p

3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment" 159 EFTA00100126 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

. at 538-39. "[L]ess drastic measures . .. such as limiting instructions, 52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims

d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 159 EFTA00077791 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

. at 538-39. "[L]ess drastic measures . .. such as limiting instructions, 52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims

d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 159 EFTA00039606 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

the counts would waste judicial resources by requiring a second trial at 53 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,' her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). 152 EFTA00095244 First, the use of pseudonyms to ref

the relevance of these allegations, the defendant has not satisfied the "exacting" standard required to justify striking portions of an Indictment. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (quoting Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 610). Accordingly, the motion should be denied, or, 57 The defense motion takes issue wi

d. at 538-39. "[L]ess drastic measures ... such as limiting instructions, 52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC),

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims

d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 159 EFTA00103184 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

s that, "while not the equivalent of criminal a post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thorn v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]se

7,262 United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001 ) 241, 242 United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1976) 139 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 231, 241, 247 United States v. Muric, No. 10 Cr. 112 (LTS), 2010 WL 2891178 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) 86 Un

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

7, 262 United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) 241, 242 United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1976) 139 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 231, 241, 247 United States v. Muric, No. 10 Cr. 112 (LTS), 2010 WL 2891178 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) 86 Un

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

7, 262 United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) 241, 242 United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1976) 139 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 231, 241, 247 United States v. Muric, No. 10 Cr. 112 (LTS), 2010 WL 2891178 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) 86 Un

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

60, 163, 171 United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) 159 United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1976) 97 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 152, 159, 162 United States v. Muric, No. 10 Cr. 112 (LTS), 2010 WL 2891178 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) 59 Un