Epstein Secrets

ails. The traditional rule of grand jury secrecy may be set aside under certain circumstances prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). The Supreme Court has explained that a party seeking disclosure of grand jury materials must make a showing of a "particularized need." United States v. Aisenberg, 3

re of grand jury materials must make a showing of a "particularized need." United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1348 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol 27 EFTA00010568 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 462 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/24/2019 Page 28 of 32 Stops Northwes

y or for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication I. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for ars litigation

is greater than the need for continued secrecy"; and (3) "that their request is structured to cover only material so needed." Id. at 1348 (citing Douglas Oil Co.,N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)). These demanding standards apply even after the grand jury has concluded its operations. Id. The burden of demonstr

s claim that would entitle him to relief." Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme Court rejected the notion that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibili

by the corporations which are defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that it

rgue that the work-product privilege is unavailable for a number of reasons. (DE 265 at 6, 8, 14-16). The work-product doctrine traces its roots to the Supreme Court's recognition that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain r 161 degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties an

F.3d at 1347. "The district court has 'substantial discretion' in determining whether grand jury materials should be released." Id. at 1349 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 223, 99 S. Ct. 1667, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979)). For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059572 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT

for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663, 668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(bX3)] protects materials prepared for ae litigation o

.3d at 1347. "The district court has `substantial discretion' in determining whether grand jury materials should be released." Id. at 1349 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 223 (1979)). Whether proceeding under Rule 6(e)(3) or the court's inherent authority, there are well 5 EFTA_R1

for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663, 668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for ay litigation o

ed secrecy; and (3) the request is structured to cover only needed materials. United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 235 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)). 20. Portions of Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 are relevant to a judicial proceeding, that is, the Ja

r for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for ars litigation

.3d at 1347. "The district court has 'substantial discretion' in determining whether grand jury materials should be released." Id. at 1349 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 223 (1979)). Whether proceeding under Rule 6(e)(3) or the court's inherent authority, there are well 5 EFTA016

empt to engraft a right of access to government information to section 3771(c)(1) should be rejected. In Pennsylvania'. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause grants a criminal defendant a trial right to cross- examine a witness. It hastened to add, "[tjhe ability to

einger, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (S.D. Fl. 2009): "The proper functioning of our grand iury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings," Douglas Oil Co. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979), and this expectation of privacy is generally codified in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Crimi

s claim that would entitle him to relief." Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley I. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme Court rejected the notion that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibili

by the corporations which are defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that it will

empt to engraft a right of access to government information to section 3771(cXI) should be rejected. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause grants a criminal defendant a trial right to cross- examine a witness. It hastened to add, Itthe ability to

inger, 626 F. Supp. 24i 1231 (S.D. Fl. 2009): "The proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings," Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979), and this expectation of privacy is generally codified in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Cri