Epstein Secrets

the district in which the crime occurred." Judge Jones said the Crime Victims Rights Act affords victims

in opposition to a plea. The prosecutor refused to convey that information to the court and the trial judge accepted the plea. When the issue reached the Utah Supreme Court, the court concluded that the prosecutor had an ethical obligation as an officer of the court to convey that information to the judge: Prosecutors m

n handedly to both prosecution and the defense. Neither side is required to disclose the address or telephone number of a victim, thus complying with the Supreme Court's instruction that "in the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two- 204 See infra notes 528-539 and ac

e with the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones, in which the court set such a high bar for any p

f Justice assigned by the attorney general the responsibility for advancing the legal positions of the United States, including in representations to the U.S. Supreme Court.) The Jaworski filing notes how critical it is to identify the president as one of the criminal accused: "the identification of each co-conspirator -

a "cloud" over the presidency. The notion that reputational harm alone should preclude a normal part of the system of justice seems incompatible with the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones, in which the court set such a high bar for any presidential immunity from the normal process of litigation that not a s

rnal quotations and citations omitted); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 80

upport of this argument, the Federal Plaintiffs cite Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 480, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003), in which the Supreme Court held that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. has specifically addressed the issue. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_01