Epstein Secrets

ations Center in Oahu. It employed threat analysts to surrep- titiously monitor the secret activities of potential enemies, mainly China, Russia, and North Korea. A large part of their job was to make transparent to the United States the hostile activities of the Russian and Chinese services so that they posed

act with high-profile activists who were part of the anti-surveillance movements. This would include core participants in the Tor Project, WikiLeaks, Noisebridge, CryptoParties, the Free- @ dom of the Press Foundation, and the Electronic Frontier Founda- @ tion. (Snowden, for example, had been in touch with m

w on the activities of adversary nations in the Pacific region, it was able to monitor the ballistic missile tests and submarine activities of China, North Korea and Russia. As the NSA developed it, this Hawatian base became one of its primary regional bases for gathering Asian communications intelligence. By

cted to others with whom Snowden had contacted for his crypto party. Lee had been an associate of Runa Sandvik’s at TOR and was a prominent member of Noisebridge, an eclectic anti- government hackers’ commune based in Northern California, of which Appelbaum was also a member. To contact Lee, Snowden chose the

xceptions, the flights to them had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the US, and which could seize Snowden. The three exceptions were China, North Korea (via China) and Russia. The only one of these three countries, or any other country, that Snowden is known to have dealt with directly during his 33

tact with high-profile activists who are part of the anti-surveillance movements. This would include core participants in the TOR project, Wikileaks, Noisebridge, Crypto Parties, and the Freedom of the Press Foundation and the Electronic Freedom Foundation. (Snowden, for example, had been in touch with members