Epstein Secrets

f its transitions and the ease with which the survival game may be embedded within it, we base our model on the haploid population-genetic model of Moran (1958).The standard version of the Moran model pairs single births and deaths such that the population size remains constant. In the absence of se

viva I game but included a general probability that both members of a pair survive, thus allowing for arbitrary synergistic effects of partnership (Hauert et al.. 2006; Kun et al.. 2006) within each step of the game. Eshel and Weinshall (1988) had assumed that pairwise survival probabilities were the

ure 438: T148-T150. 64. Claussen J, Traulsen A (2005). Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process. Phys Rev E 71: 025101. 65. Docbeli M, C Hauert (2005). Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game. Ecol

Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process. Phys Rev E 71: 025101. 65. Docbeli M, C Hauert (2005). Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game. Ecol Lett 8: 748-766. Page 3 of 16 EFTA_R1_01519427 EFTA024

weak selection (as opposed to 6 cc 1) shall become clear at the end of this section. The dynamics of the system is given by the frequency dependent Moran process. In each time step a randomly chosen individual is replaced by a copy of an individual chosen with probability proportional to its payoff.

rinceton. 1152] Traulsen A, Claussen JC, 2004. Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation. Phys. Rev. E, 70, 046128. (153] Traulsen, A., Hauert, C., H. De Silva, Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K., 2009. Explo- ration dynamics in evolutionary games. PNAS 106, 709-712. [154] Traulsen, A., Nowak, M.